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Protection of the reputation of the Polish Nation 
and the Republic of Poland
Abstract: A pretext for taking up this topic was the adoption in January 2018 of the 
new Act of the Institute of National Remembrance, which aroused huge controversy. 
In this way, provisions were enacted to protect the reputation of the Republic of Po-
land and the Polish Nation. Among them, there are regulations such art. 53o and 53p 
providing civil liability for violating the reputation of the Republic of Poland and the 
Polish Nation. This part of the bill passed almost unnoticed, unlike the criminal law 
in this bill. Certainly, a full analysis of this normative act requires more time. For 
now, we can say that – as it was presented in this paper – the adopted regulation raises 
a number of doubts and questions about its proper interpretation.
Key words: protection of the reputation of the Polish Nation and the Republic of 
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Introduction
The issue of protecting the reputation (and possibly also other rights of the individual) of the Polish Nation and the Republic of Poland 
arouses both theoretical and practical interest. This task can be performed 
using a variety of measures and legal methods. This study focuses ex-
clusively on the protection measures ensured by civil law while ignoring 
other methods, in particular criminal law measures that would certainly 
require a separate discussion which seems to go beyond the limits of this 
article. Nevertheless, it should be noted that on January 17, 2019, the 
Constitutional Tribunal (file no. K1/18) ruled on the motion of the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Poland to examine the compliance with the Con-
stitution of certain amendments to the Law on the Institute of National 
Remembrance, introduced in 2018. The presidential motion, however, 
concerned only the criminal provisions introduced.
The discussion of these issues was inspired by the adoption of the 
controversial (in Poland but especially abroad) Law of January 26, 2018 
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amending the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commis-
sion for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, the Law on 
Graves and War Cemeteries, the Law on Museums and the Law on the 
Liability of Collective Entities for Acts Prohibited under Penalty (Dz. U. 
[Journal of Laws] of 2018, item 369). By virtue of these amendments, 
the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance had chapter 6(c), ti-
tled “Protection of the Reputation of the Republic of Poland and Polish 
Nation” added. The provisions in Articles 53(o) and 53(p) pertain to lia-
bility under civil law. This amendment arouses serious doubts. Firstly, the 
question arises whether such protection was ensured in the former legal 
status	quo and if so, on what legal basis. Secondly, what have the new 
regulations changed in this matter? Thirdly, how should the terms “Polish 
Nation” and “the Republic of Poland” be understood and, fourthly, who 
has locus	standi and therefore the possibility to bring an action in such 
cases? Finally, how can such actions be brought with respect to foreign 
entities, and what effectiveness will this type of legal action have outside 
Poland? This study was developed using a variety of research methods, 
including inductive and deductive reasoning, institutional and legal ana-
lysis and exegesis of legal text.
The concept of the rights of the individual
These considerations should begin with an explanation of the concept 
of the rights of the individual. This is not defined by the legislator in 
the Polish legal system (Sadomski, 2008, p. 51). Nevertheless, the le-
gal system provides for the protection of such legal rights by a varie-
ty of measures and regulations. Firstly, the rights of the individual are 
protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Article 30 of 
the Constitution stipulates the principle of the inviolable, inherent and 
inalienable dignity of a person as the source of the freedoms and rights of 
persons and citizens. Article 31(1) guarantees the protection of freedom 
of the person and Art. 41(1) – personal inviolability and freedom. Article 
47 of the Constitution stipulates the following: “Everyone shall have the 
right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honor and 
good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life.” Article 49 
of the Constitution guarantees freedom and privacy of communication; 
Art. 50 guarantees the inviolability of the home; Art. 51 stipulates the 
right of protection of personal information; Art. 53 guarantees freedom 
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of conscience and religion and Art. 54 – freedom of speech. The latter 
guarantees everyone the freedom to express opinions and to acquire and 
to disseminate information.
There are also criminal law measures, such as defamation or insult, 
and insulting the Polish nation or the Polish state (Art. 133 of the Penal 
Code). Under civil law, Art. 23 of the Civil Code uses the category of 
rights of the individual without defining them and lists examples of such 
rights. The catalog of the rights of the individual cannot therefore be de-
emed closed, and the values to which legal protection is provided are not 
exhaustively indicated here (Sokołowski, 2012; Księżak, 2014). Pursu-
ant to this regulation, the rights of the individual, in particular health, 
freedom, dignity, freedom of conscience, name or pseudonym, image, 
privacy of correspondence, inviolability of home, and scientific, artistic, 
inventive or improvement achievements are protected by civil law, inde-
pendently of protection under other regulations. On the other hand, both 
the legal doctrine and jurisprudence of Polish courts feature numerous 
attempts to define the concept of the rights of the individual (Panowicz-
Lipska, 1975, p. 23; Piątkowski, 1983, pp. 20 ff.; Cisek, 1989, pp. 35 ff., 
Wojciechowska, 1994, pp. 372 ff.; Sadomski 2008, pp. 53 ff.; Barta, Mar-
kiewicz, 2009, pp. 21 ff.; Czub, 2012, p. 56). One approach understands 
it as “the values recognized by the legal system, including the physical 
and mental integrity of a person, his individuality, dignity and position in 
society, which is the premise for the self-fulfillment of the human being” 
(Radwański, 2004, p. 156). In another definition, the rights of the indi-
vidual are “non-proprietary values that are related to human personality, 
commonly recognized in society” (Szpunar, 1979, p. 106; Pazdan, 2002; 
Rudnicki, 1992, p. 34; Grzybowski, 1957, p. 78). There have also been 
attempts to define this category in jurisprudence. The resolution passed 
by seven judges of the Supreme Court on July 16, 1993 (file no. I PZP 
28/93) stresses that “this concept should be related to a specific level of 
technological and civilizational development, moral and legal principles 
adopted in society, and to the existing type of social, economic and even 
political relations.” The Court of Appeals in Lublin issued a ruling on 
April 21, 2015 (file no. I ACa 894/14), where it reiterated the legal defi-
nitions stating that “the rights of the individual are values including the 
physical and mental integrity of a person, his individuality, dignity and 
position in society, which is the premise for self-fulfillment of a human 
being.” The above discussion implies that the category of the rights of the 
individual is by principle inherently related to the human being.
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Certain rights of the individual, however, are protected with respect 
to collective subjects. Dignity is protected by virtue of international law, 
including European law, as well as by the regulations in the constitution. 
Human dignity is referred to in this case. In the context discussed in this 
study, Art. 30 of the Constitution is of particular significance, which sti-
pulates the following: “The inherent and inalienable dignity of the person 
shall constitute a source of freedoms and rights of persons and citizens.” 
Article 47 of the Constitution guarantees the protection of honor and good 
reputation among other things. As mentioned above, one of the rights of 
the individual explicitly indicated in Art. 23 of the Civil Code is “honor.” 
At present, honor is equivalent to dignity in judicature, as evidenced by 
the verdict passed by the Supreme Court on October 29, 1971 (file no. II 
CR 455/71), which claims that “honor and dignity are values all humans 
are entitled to” and “a person’s honor, good name and reputation are con-
cepts embracing all fields of life” (Sobczak, 2006, p. 9). There are legal 
opinions where human dignity is divided into external – good reputation, 
and internal – personal dignity (Szpunar, 1979, p. 129). Typically, it is as-
sumed that in colloquial speech, dignity will mean respect, reverence, re-
cognition, honor, good reputation and personal dignity (ruling of June 2, 
2009, SK 31/08, OTK-A 2009, no. 6, item 83, ruling of the Constitutional 
Tribunal of October 30, 2006, P 10/06, OTK-A 2006, no. 9, item 128, 
ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal of September 29, 2008, SK 52/05 
OTK-A 2008, no. 7, item 125). The view presented in legal doctrine that 
the protection of honor embraces all fields of human activity, namely per-
sonal, professional and social life, should be agreed with. The ruling pas-
sed by the Supreme Court on April 25, 1989 (file no. I CR 143/89) argues 
that “personal dignity is this part of personality which focuses on the per-
son’s feeling of his own value and the expectation of respect from other 
persons. This feeling forms a significant part of the human psyche and 
is formed by numerous different external factors. It is not permanent. As 
a product of the development of human nature, it is conditioned by history 
and culture. The assessment of whether human dignity has been violated 
or not is based on objective criteria rather than on a subjective feeling of 
the person demanding to be legally protected. The measure allowing the 
assessment of whether a person’s dignity has been violated or not should 
be sought in public opinion.” Another important ruling was passed by the 
Constitutional Tribunal on February 7, 2005 (file no. Sk 49/03, OTK A 
2005, no. 2, item 13), which stressed that no regulation justifies the claim 
that dignity has to be protected solely in proprietary terms. On the contra-
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ry, the manner of protecting human dignity has to be associated with the 
moral standards of a given society. It is well-established social beliefs that 
imply how a moral harm should be removed and repaired. The dignity of 
a human person always requires courts of justice and other public autho-
rities to ensure that every moral harm will be removed and repaired as far 
as possible. Another opinion deserving support is that a breach of reputa-
tion may “consist of falsely accusing a person of such behavior or charac-
teristics that may humiliate the person in public opinion or expose them 
to the loss of confidence needed for a given position, occupation or type 
of activity. This may involve both the dissemination of a specific content 
that constitutes an allegation against the individual, and the expression of 
a negative assessment of their activity” (Wierciński, 2002, p. 60).
The rights of the individual are typically classified in civil law doctrine 
as so-called absolute subjective rights, effective erga	omnes	(Barta, Markie-
wicz, 2005, p. 21). Due to being inherently related to the human person, the 
rights of the individual are inalienable, non-transferable via inter	vivos, and 
cannot be inherited. Consequently, only the aggrieved party can demand 
(has a locus	standi) protection of the rights of the individual. Importantly, 
non-pecuniary claims formulated on this basis are not subject to the statute 
of limitations (Piasecki, 2003). Another dominating opinion is that the con-
cept of the rights of the individual is objective rather than subjective. This 
means that “both when explaining the nature of the rights of the individual 
and that of their violation an objective criterion should be applied which 
refers to assessments by society” (Pazdan, 2012).
Protection of the rights of the individual for legal persons
The current legal system guarantees a certain extent of protection of the 
rights of the individual for legal persons, too (Cisek, 1989; Koczanowski, 
1990, pp. 17–30; Kubiak-Cyrul, 2005; Matys, 2006; Michałowska, 2015, 
pp. 7–18). This is of significance, since the same principles can apparently 
apply to such collective entities as nations, among others. It should therefo-
re be remembered that, pursuant to Art. 33 of the Civil Code, legal persons 
include the State Treasury and organizational units which are attributed le-
gal personality under specific laws. Pursuant to Art. 43 of the Civil Code, 
in turn, the provisions on the protection of the rights of the individual for 
natural persons apply to legal persons, too. The ruling of the Supreme Co-
urt passed on November 14, 1986 (file no. II CR 295/86) stresses that “the 
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rights of the individual for legal persons are non-proprietary values thanks 
to which a legal person can operate within the scope of its activities.” The 
ruling of the Supreme Court passed on May 25, 1977 (file no. I CR 159/77), 
indicates that “pursuant to Art. 43 of the Civil Code, the provisions on the 
protection of the rights of the individual for natural persons apply to legal 
persons [...] However, the accurate application of Art. 23 of the Civil Code 
excludes from protection such rights of the individual as [...] image, which 
cannot be taken into consideration in the case of legal persons.” In this 
context, particular attention should be given to the ruling by the Court of 
Appeals in Białystok, passed on November 6, 2015 (file no. I ACa 585/15), 
which puts forward a thesis that the protection of the rights of the individual 
for legal persons pertains to their rights associated with their operations and 
ensuring their uninterrupted functioning, in particular such rights as their 
name (company), trademark, commercial reputation and privacy of corre-
spondence. The rights of the individual for legal persons also include good 
reputation, brand, renown and well-established position. The rights of the 
individual related to the sphere of feelings, such as dignity, have been exc-
luded from attribution to legal persons. The protection of the rights of the 
individual for legal persons depends solely on an objectively determined 
infringement of their rights of the individual by an unlawful act (Skrzyp-
czak, 2017, pp. 137 ff.).
It is, however, doubtful whether the State Treasury is entitled to the 
protection of the rights of the individual arising from damage to the repu-
tation of the Republic of Poland or the Polish Nation. It seems, therefore, 
that the justification of the above-mentioned Law on the Institute of Na-
tional Remembrance rightly states that, in the current legal status	quo, 
the concept of bringing claims for damages (for the repair of a pecuniary 
damage) against entities using damaging language arouses doubts, as it 
is impossible to indicate damages to state property, while making claims 
under civil law on the basis of the protection of the rights of the individual 
is also considerably questionable in Polish law.
Protection of the rights of the individual for determined  
communities
As indicated above, it is considerably more complicated to assess 
whether determined communities that are not granted the status of legal 
persons under current law, such as nations, have the possibility of deman-
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ding that their rights of the individual be protected (Skrzypczak, 2017, 
pp. 144 ff.). In the understanding of civil law, such groups are not a sepa-
rate subject of law. They can be granted protection under separate regu-
lations. Pursuant to Art. 4(1) of the Polish Constitution, “Supreme power 
in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation.” This provision 
inspires different interpretations of how to define this notion, i.e. who can 
qualify as a nation. The prevailing opinion is that “the case concerned 
regards all citizens of the Polish Republic (as defined in the Preamble), 
which means that membership of the nation understood in this manner is 
based on holding Polish citizenship. We are dealing with the Nation in the 
legal and political rather than ethnic terms. Who is part of the Nation is 
decided by the principles of citizenship” (Skrzydło, 2013, p. 235). Addi-
tionally, pursuant to Art. 1 of the Constitution, “The Republic of Poland 
shall be the common good of all its citizens” while Art. 82 stipulates that 
“[l]oyalty to the Republic of Poland, as well as concern for the common 
good, shall be the duty of every Polish citizen.” Article 85(1) makes it the 
duty of every Polish citizen to defend the homeland.
Protection of the reputation of the Republic of Poland  
and the Polish Nation
Before the amendments were introduced, the protection of the repu-
tation of the Polish Nation was exercised on the basis of the legal status	
quo discussed above. The ruling of the Supreme Court issued on De-
cember 12, 1978 (file no. IV CR 421/78) stated that the publication of 
unverified information about incidents of collaboration with the Germans 
during the occupation was not only unlawful, but also harmful. The issue 
of the unlawfulness of the defendant was the more serious, as he was 
a historian and collaborator with the Commission for the Investigation of 
Nazi Crimes in Poland. While it is in the social interest to reveal all acts 
of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers, it is also in the interest of the 
entire Nation for the facts from its modern history, including the difficult 
period of the occupation, to be presented truthfully. The following rulings 
clearly set a precedent: the ruling passed by the District Court in Olsztyn 
on February 24, 2015 (file no. I C 726/13), the ruling passed by the Court 
of Appeals in Krakow on December 22, 2016 (file no. I ACa 1080/16), 
the ruling passed by the Court of Appeals in Warsaw on March 31, 2016 
(file no. I ACa 971/15), which stipulated that the national heritage, legacy, 
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identification with the achievements and values represented by ancestors 
is a right of the individual protected by virtue of Art. 23 and Art. 24 of 
the Civil Code. The continuation and cultivation of ancestors’ traditions 
is recognized as a significant value, also taking into account objective 
criteria. In the justification to the verdict, it was said that in order to re-
cognize the violation of the sense of national identity by speaking about 
Polish concentration camps it is not necessary for this statement to indica-
te a concrete person who is a member of the Polish nation. Uttering such 
a statement directly damages the values related to individual participation 
in a community which naturally shapes this individual’s personality. It 
enters the realm of values forming the foundation of the protection of 
honor understood as personal dignity, because it refers to the continuation 
associated with participation in the Polish national community, being the 
same and maintaining continuity. The justification of the verdict issued by 
the court indicated that the current existence of the national community 
is an extension of its existence in the past. Importantly, it stressed the fact 
that speaking about Polish concentration camps violated the plaintiff’s 
right to identify with the nation which had experienced the atrocity of 
concentration camps and whose ancestors (grandparents) had been perse-
cuted in concentration camps. The historical events which constitute the 
legacy of remembrance of the community and its individual members, 
have an unprecedented character and are considered as an indisputable 
fact, cannot be relativized because they undermine the feeling of national 
belonging and create a sense of wrong, creating a grossly false image of 
Poland among the public, and attributing to Poles features that strip them 
of dignity and undermine their sense of value. The right of feeling national 
identity is rooted in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The justification to the 
ruling stressed the fact that speaking about Polish concentration camps is 
an ambiguous presentation of facts, which could mislead hearers, some 
of whom might interpret this as information about the participation of the 
Polish nation in establishing concentration camps or in the crimes com-
mitted in them, while it is a journalist’s task to avoid the dissemination of 
such fragmentary information which creates a risk of misleading people. 
In the opinion of the court, it could not be assumed that this was a case of 
a mental shortcut allowed by the law. The dissemination of such phrases 
is against the law and has resulted in a violation of the plaintiff’s rights 
of the individual in the form of the sense of national identity and national 
dignity. Importantly, the Court of Appeals decided that the plaintiff had 
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a locus	standi in this case. The defendant’s statements entered the realm 
of non-proprietary values associated with the plaintiff’s personality. This 
means that the claim to protect the feeling of national dignity can be sub-
mitted not by the State Treasury as a separate legal person, or by any other 
government body or institution, but by an individual, a natural person 
who identifies with the Polish Nation.
Protection of the reputation of the Republic of Poland  
and the Polish Nation in light of the amendment to the Law  
on the Institute of National Remembrance
Controversy has clearly been aroused by the aforementioned Law of 
January 26, 2018 amending the Law on the Institute of National Remem-
brance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish 
Nation, the Law on Graves and War Cemeteries, the Law on Museums 
and the Law on the Liability of Collective Entities for Acts Prohibited 
under Penalty (Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] of 2018, item 369). The authors 
of the justification for the draft (Druk sejmowy [Parliamentary print] 
no. 806) supported the need to introduce such legal solutions, on the one 
hand referring to the attitude presented by the Constitutional Tribunal in 
its ruling of October 30, 2006 (file no. P 10/06), that in light of Art. 31(3) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland there is no ground to at-
tribute priority to the protection of freedom of speech over other con-
stitutional freedoms and rights; on the other hand, the Tribunal made 
reference to the judgement delivered by the European Court of Human 
Rights on October 15, 2015 in the case of Perinçek v. Switzerland (Ap-
plication no. 27510/08), which confirmed that the dignity of the victims 
and the feeling of identity of contemporary Armenians can be protected 
under Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private life) and can 
be deemed to be a justified goal of intervention in the understanding of 
Art. 10(2) of the Convention.
As regards the protection ensured by civil law, the justification of the 
draft stressed that “the provisions stipulating the rules for pursuing claims 
arising from the violation of the reputation of the Republic of Poland and 
the Polish Nation, proposed in the new chapter 6(c) of the Law on the In-
stitute of National Remembrance constitute a significant systemic novelty. 
In this regard, it is proposed to refer to the provisions of the Civil Code on 
the protection of the rights of the individual.” By virtue of this normative 
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act, chapter 6(c) entitled Protection	of	the	reputation	of	the	Republic	of	
Poland	and	the	Polish	Nation was introduced to the legal order. Article 
53(o) explicitly provides that, for the protection of the reputation of the 
Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation, the relevant provisions of the 
Civil Code on the protection of the rights of the individual apply. This 
regulation implies that the Polish Nation and the Republic of Poland are 
entitled to protection of their reputation. Additionally, the authors of the 
draft explain that as regards the legal regulations pertaining to the terms 
“Republic of Poland” and “Polish Nation,” pursuant to the Preamble to 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the “Polish Nation” means all 
the citizens of the Republic of Poland, while “Republic of Poland” is the 
name of the Polish state which is the common good of all its citizens pur-
suant to Art. 1 of the Polish Constitution. In the opinion of the authors of 
the justification for the amendment, the regulations proposed attributing 
analogous rights of the individual to the Republic of Poland and the Pol-
ish Nation as to legal persons. This conclusion, however, is questionable 
and the legislature should be criticized for failing to make a clear decision 
to this effect in the law concerned. While the concept of the Republic of 
Poland, defined as a common good of all citizens, is important, it never-
theless refers to the state, and thus cannot be considered as a subject.
The legal opinions on the amendment concerned criticized it because 
“the rights of the individual can be attributed solely to persons who can 
be subjects of civil law relationships. Neither the Republic of Poland nor 
the Polish Nation is such a subject. The formulation of the law cannot be 
justified by saying that the provisions on the protection of the rights of the 
individual will be applied ‘accordingly.’ In other words, civil law cannot 
be extended to embrace civil law relationships in which certain entities 
cannot participate. This may result in a lawsuit being rejected pursuant to 
Art. 199(1)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, due to one of the parties 
lacking legal capacity. These circumstances are not changed by the fact 
that the action to protect the reputation of the Republic of Poland or the 
Polish Nation can be filed by a non-governmental organization under its 
statutory responsibilities or by the Institute of National Remembrance. 
Organizations are not the subjects of proceedings, but act for the benefit 
of the party with legal capacity. Thus the Law does not include an explicit 
provision that the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation are attributed 
with the rights of the individual in the understanding of the Civil Code, 
nor that the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation are treated as sub-
jects with legal capacity. It is also not stated that the cases for the protec-
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tion of the rights of the individual for the Republic of Poland and the 
Polish Nation are treated as civil cases to which the provisions of the Civil 
Code and the Code of Civil Procedure apply and, when need arises, these 
provisions are applied accordingly” (Wyrembak after Guzik, 2018).
Another doubt that needs to be considered concerns the question of 
whether the principles developed with respect to the protection of the 
rights of the individual for legal persons should be applied to the Republic 
of Poland and the Polish Nation. It is not easy to answer this question. On 
the one hand, the catalog of the rights of the individual subject to protec-
tion in such cases will be even more restricted, coming down solely to the 
protection of good reputation. On the other hand, this concept is likely to 
be treated more widely and cannot be reduced to the synonyms of good 
reputation, renown and well-established position, as is the case of legal 
persons. It is beyond doubt that the protection of legal persons demanding 
the protection of the rights of the individual associated with the realm of 
feelings, such as dignity, is excluded; however, this it is not the case with 
the categories examined here. In this case it is possible to indicate and 
refer to the realm of feelings shared by members of the community, in this 
event – the feeling of national dignity. This conclusion cannot, however, 
defy the general idea that the protection of the rights of the individual for 
legal persons depends solely on an objectively determined infringement 
of their rights of the individual by an unlawful act.
As regards the above-quoted provision in the Law on the Institute of 
National Remembrance that stipulates that the relevant regulations of the 
Civil Code should be applied, it should be assumed that the reasons for 
implementing such civil liability are identical to those indicated in Art. 24 
of the Civil Code. These reasons include, firstly, the existence of a specific 
right of the individual (in this case, reputation); secondly, the fact that such 
a right is in threatened or subject to breach and, thirdly, the unlawfulness 
(the ruling passed by the Court of Appeals in Łódź on December 17, 2015, 
file no. I ACa 806/15) of such threat or breach. The concept of the rights of 
the individual has been discussed above, so it will be ignored here, whereas 
attention needs to be given to further reasons determined in Art. 24 of the 
Civil Code. Legal doctrine, as well as jurisprudence, rightfully indicate that 
“the concept of the protection of the rights of the individual is based on the 
presumption of the unlawfulness of the activity which interfered in the field 
covered by the protection of the rights of the individual” (Barta, Markie-
wicz, 2005, p. 25). This approach results in the burden to provide evidence 
being transferred to the person infringing on any of the values protected by 
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virtue of these regulations. In other words, it is the defendant who is requ-
ired to evidence that their behavior was not unlawful. Unlawful behavior 
is deemed to be inconsistent with legal norms or the principles of social 
coexistence. It is rightfully claimed in legal doctrine that the interpretation 
of the above cannot be broadened, and it cannot mean that the transmitted 
content is presumed to be false. The general principles of the distribution 
of the burden of evidence apply in this regard (Barta, Markiewicz, 2005, 
p. 25). Similarly, it is stressed in the ruling passed by the Supreme Court 
on June 4, 2003 (file no. I CKN 480/01) that “Art. 25 of the Civil Code 
includes […] the presumption of the unlawful activity of the perpetrator 
of the breach of the rights of the individual, which is why the obligation 
to evidence that this activity was not unlawful burdens the perpetrator. In 
conformity with the objective concept of unlawfulness applied in the Po-
lish law, unlawful behavior is behavior contrary to legal regulations or the 
principles of social coexistence, and unlawfulness excludes activities based 
on legal regulations, compliant with the principles of social coexistence, 
acting with the consent of the aggrieved party or exercise of subjective 
law.” A similar standpoint is expressed in a more recent ruling passed by 
the Court of Appeals in Białystok on May 7, 2015 (file no. I ACa 703/14), 
and stating that “such protection is ensured to prevent an unlawful breach 
of a right of the individual, understood as behavior contrary to the norms of 
law or principles of social coexistence, regardless of the perpetrator’s guilt 
or even awareness.” The catalog of circumstances in which the unlawful-
ness of the breach of the rights of the individual is excluded justifiably inc-
ludes “activities within the framework of the legal order, namely activities 
permitted by the legal regulations in force, exercising of subjective law, 
the consent of the aggrieved party (although with certain reservations) and 
acting to protect a justifiable interest” (Piasecki, 2003, thesis 4). The ruling 
passed by the Supreme Court on April 7, 2009 (file no. I PK 210/08) states 
that “the unlawfulness of the perpetrator’s actions alone is not sufficient 
for the claims referred to in Art. 24 of the Civil Code to arise. A result of 
the perpetrator’s action is necessary, such as the infringement of one of the 
rights stipulated in Art. 23 of the Civil Code.” Importantly, “to some extent, 
a majority of laws exclude the unlawfulness of the breach of a certain right 
of the individual” (Księżak, 2014). Working to protect the rights of the in-
dividual for natural and legal persons, courts have developed a consistent 
line of rulings whereby (ruling passed by the Court of Appeals in Katowice 
on April 30, 2015, file no. I ACa 1093/14, LEX nr 1740628) “whether or 
not a right of the individual has been violated due to someone’s behavior is 
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determined by an objective criterion, such as the perception of this behavior 
by a reasonable, impartial listener who is not emotionally involved, and the 
subjective reception of the person who considers themselves an aggrieved 
party is of no significance (ruling passed by the Court of Appeals in Warsaw 
on May 18, 2016, file no. VI ACa 612/15 LEX nr 2076725). It appears that 
this concept will also apply to the protection of the reputation of the Repu-
blic of Poland and the Polish Nation.
It was also justifiably postulated in legal doctrine that “it is not justified 
to restrict the circle of entities that can file a claim for the protection of the 
above-mentioned rights only to former prisoners of German concentration 
and death camps or to their relatives and, additionally, it is not necessary to 
include an indication of the plaintiff in the contents of the message in order 
to bring an action” (Rakiewicz, 2009, p. 39; Guzik, 2018).
The above-quoted regulation stipulates that an action for the protection 
of the reputation of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation can be bro-
ught by a non-governmental organization within the framework of its statu-
tory tasks (Guzik, 2018). Pursuant to Art. 3(2) of the Law of April 24, 2003 
on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work (Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] of 2016, 
item 1817), non-governmental organizations are, firstly, entities which do 
not form part of the public finance sector and which are not enterprises, 
research institutes, banks or commercial law corporations that are the legal 
persons of central or local governments; and, secondly, entities which do 
not operate for profit – corporate and non-corporate entities, which accor-
ding to separate legal provisions have the capacity to perform acts in law, 
such as foundations and associations. Thus, only social organizations that 
meet the above criteria will have the locus	standi to file such claims. Ho-
wever, there is an additional requirement here, namely the matter of protec-
ting the reputation of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation has to 
be included among the statutory tasks of such organizations. Additionally, 
pursuant to Art. 53(p) of this Law, this is also a prerogative of the Institute 
of National Remembrance, which has legal capacity in such cases. Whereas 
the wording of Art. 53(p) does not explicitly stipulate such a possibility, gi-
ven the verdicts passed so far, it cannot be ruled out that such an action can 
be brought by a natural person who identifies with the Polish Nation.
By virtue of the above regulation, it is stipulated that redress or compen-
sation will be due to the State Treasury. This is not, however, the exhaustive 
catalog of claims provided for in the Civil Code. Pursuant to Art. 24(1) of 
the Civil Code, the person whose right of the individual is threatened by 
someone else’s action, can demand that this action be abandoned, unless it 
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is not unlawful. In the event of infringement, he may also demand that the 
person who has committed the infringement take the actions necessary to 
remove its consequences, in particular submit a statement of appropriate 
content and in an appropriate form. It results from the above that in the case 
of a threat to the rights of the individual, one is entitled to demand such an 
activity to be abandoned. In the event of a breach having taken place, the 
plaintiff is entitled not only to demand for such activities to be abandoned, 
but also for the person who committed the infringement to take the actions 
necessary to remove its consequences, such as submitting a statement of 
appropriate content and in an appropriate form. This does not preclude the 
possibility of seeking redress under the terms of Art. 448 of the Civil Code. 
Pursuant to Art. 24(2) of the Civil Code, whereby if proprietary damage 
occurred due to the infringement of a right of the individual, the aggrie-
ved party can demand its reparation on general terms. A doubt arises here, 
then, whether a non-governmental institution or the Institute of National 
Remembrance demanding the protection of the tarnished reputation of the 
Republic of Poland or the Polish Nation are entitled only to receive redress, 
compensation, or all the above. The latter option seems accurate.
Additionally, the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance sti-
pulates that the above provisions will apply regardless of which law is 
applicable. It is stressed in the justification to the Law that “international 
jurisdiction in such cases will be determined primarily in conformity with 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and en-
forcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (and in the event 
where an entity infringing the reputation of the Republic of Poland or the 
Polish Nation is not domiciled in any EU state – according to the regula-
tions of the Code of Civil Procedure). This means that Polish courts will 
be competent to try such cases either when – pursuant to a general provi-
sion (Art. 4(1) of the Regulation) – the defendant (the infringing party) is 
domiciled in the Republic of Poland or when – pursuant to the provisions 
on special jurisdiction in matters of prohibited acts (Art. 7(2) of the Re-
gulation) – ‘the harmful event occurred’ in the Republic of Poland (e.g. 
in the event of media torts – when information harmful to the reputation 
of the Republic of Poland or the Polish Nation is disseminated also in the 
Republic of Poland and produces negative outcomes there).” Additional-
ly, the justification to the Law explains that, as concerns the principles 
determining which law is applicable to the protection of the rights of the 
individual (as indicated in the draft regulations on the protection of the 
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reputation of the Republic of Poland or the Polish Nation), in principle, 
they are stipulated in the Law of February 4, 2011 on Private International 
Law (Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] item 432, as amended). It is also noted 
that these matters are excluded from the scope to which Regulation (EC) 
No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) ap-
plies, on the basis of Art. 1(2)(g) of this Regulation.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Law on Private International Law (Art. 
16(2) and Art. 20), in the event of infringement or threat that a right of the 
individual may be infringed, protection can be demanded on the basis of 
either the law of the state where an event resulting in such infringement or 
threat of infringement occurred, or the law of the state where the results of 
such infringement occurred. Therefore, in order to ensure that the Polish 
provisions on the protection of the reputation of the Republic of Poland or 
the Polish Nation apply in every case, irrespective of what law is applicable 
in light of the Law on Private International Law, an additional provision is 
proposed (new Art. 53(r) in the Law on the Institute of National Remem-
brance) which will unambiguously indicate that these are overriding man-
datory regulations (cf. Art. 8(1) of the Law on Private International Law).
Conclusions
In the prior legal framework, attempts were made, quite successfully, 
to protect the reputation of the Polish Nation based on Art. 23 of the Civil 
Code. The amendment examined in this article raises numerous doubts and 
questions about its appropriate interpretation. It practically ignores rulings 
passed by courts using the prior legal framework and allows members of 
a specific group, e.g. the Polish Nation, to pursue claims in an event of a vio-
lation of the feeling of national dignity. The domestic, but primarily interna-
tional criticism of the amendment to the Law and the Institute of National 
Remembrance first and foremost pertained to the regulations stipulating 
penal measures. In the context of freedom of speech, less controversy was 
aroused by the above-discussed civil law solutions enabling a response to 
such acts. The above analysis has attempted to demonstrate, however, that 
even those solutions are not faultless and need to be approached critically. 
Taking into account the history of judicial decisions, questions about the 
purpose of introducing new solutions should be asked, as similar, or even 
further-reaching results could have been achieved under the previous law.
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In the amendment, the “Polish Nation” is defined pursuant to the Pre-
amble to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as all the citizens of 
the Republic of Poland, while “Republic of Poland” is the name of the Po-
lish state which, according to Art. 1 of the Constitution is a common good 
of all its citizens. Art. 53(o) of the Law explicitly stipulates that, for the 
protection of the reputation of the Republic of Poland and Polish Nation, 
the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on the protection of the rights of 
the individual apply. An action to protect the reputation of the Republic 
of Poland or the Polish Nation can be brought by a non-governmental 
organization under its statutory responsibilities. Additionally, in confor-
mity with Art. 53(p) of the Law, the Institute of National Remembrance 
also has the same prerogatives. However, the Law stipulates that redress 
or compensation will be due to the State Treasury. Although the Law inc-
ludes provisions on the jurisdiction of Polish courts, seeking redress, and 
even more so the execution of compensation is problematic. A question 
therefore arises whether such legal solutions are justified. Paradoxically, 
non-legal measures and methods, such as education, promotion or social 
pressure, can turn out to be more effective than imposing legal sanctions, 
including civil law.
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Ochrona dobrego imienia Narodu Polskiego i Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
 
Streszczenie
Pretekstem do podjęcia tej problematyki ochrony dobrego imienia Narodu Pol-
skiego i Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej było uchwalenie w styczniu 2018 r. wzbudzającej 
ogromne kontrowersje ustawy o zmianie ustawy o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej. 
W ten sposób wprowadzono przepisy przewidujące ochronę dobrego imienia Rzeczy-
pospolitej Polskiej i Narodu Polskiego. Pośród nich zaproponowano przepisy art. 53o 
i 53p przewidujące odpowiedzialność cywilnoprawną. Ten fragment ustawy przeszedł 
właściwie niezauważony, inaczej niż wzbudzające ogromne emocje przepisy przewi-
dujące odpowiedzialność karną. Z pewnością pełna analiza tego aktu normatywnego 
wymaga znacznie dłuższego czasu. Jak wyżej próbowano wykazać, przyjęta regulacja 
rodzi szereg wątpliwości i pytań o jej właściwą wykładnię. Pomija w zasadzie całko-
wicie dorobek judykatury, który w poprzednim stanie prawnym pozwalał członkowi 
określonej grupy np. Narodu Polskiego dochodzenia roszczeń w przypadku narusze-
nia poczucia godności narodowej.
 
Słowa kluczowe: ochrona dobrego imienia Narodu Polskiego i Rzeczypospolitej Pol-
skiej
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